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The purpose of this article is to review the Italian law of
insider trading, the Insider Trading Act of 1991 (Act or Insider
Trading Act),' using as a benchmark of comparison the Ameri-
can experience and the body of insider trading law developed
by American courts on the basis of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) Rules.2 Since American law is prob-
ably the most developed example of insider trading law, such
comparison is apt in order to elucidate the different approach
adopted by Italy.
Fundamentally, there are three differences between the
Italian and the American law. First, Italian law attempts to
codify by defining and circumscribing the regulated phenome-
non, thus granting, supposedly, greater certainty to the legality
of the investors' conduct,' whereas in the American experience
the approach is a case-by-case development without any at-
tempt at precise legislative definition. Second, Italian law
focuses on possession of material nonpublic information.
Hence, it seems to be primarily concerned with the protection
of investors' equal access to information. Instead, American
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1. Law of May 17, 1991, No. 157, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana
[Gazz. Uff.] (May 20, 1991, No. 116), 77 Lex Part I, at 1241 [hereinafter Insider
Trading Act]. See Appendix for the full annotated text of the Insider Trading Act,
in an unofficial translation. This Act implemented the corresponding European
Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L334) 30 [hereinafter Insider Trading Direc-
tive].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1995).
3. Thomas L. Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons from the Euro-
pean Community Directive on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231,
236-38 (1992).
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law, under Rule 10b-5,4 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the SEC, rejects
the equal access approach and focuses on fraudulent and de-
ceitful behavior whereby some individuals gain informational
advantages over other investors. Third, Italian law punishes
the behavior of insiders even when no trading takes place.6 In
contrast, under American law, for SEC Rule 10b-5 to apply,
the fraudulent behavior becomes relevant only "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."' Hence, no violation
of Rule 10b-5 can be found unless there is trading by someone.
Finally, because the language of the statute is unclear in its
own terms and because five years after Italy's promulgation of
the Act the law has yet to be interpreted or applied by Italian
courts,8 caution is recommended in accepting any proposed
interpretative conclusion and solution.
Part II of this article will first broadly describe the context
in which the Italian statute was issued and how it fits within
the legal system. A detailed description of the Italian law will
follow in Part III. In Parts IV-VIII, the main aspects of the
Italian insider trading legislation will be reviewed, including
the definition of the "insider," the notion of inside information,
the scienter requirement, and comparisons with current U.S.
law. It will also be suggested that the definition of material
information under U.S. law be referenced in order to help de-
fine inside information under Italian law. In conclusion, it will
be argued that the different regulatory solutions adopted by
the Italian and the American legislatures are the results of
qualitatively different approaches and philosophies respecting
the insider trading phenomenon.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-211, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994).
6. In fact, punishment is triggered for violations of the "tipping" and "recom-
mendation" prohibitions. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
8. So far, only one Italian court decision has been based upon the Insider
Trading Act. Judgment of Nov. 16, 1994, Tribunale Milano, 1995 Foro Italiano
[Foro It.] 1 469. However, that decision only concerned article 5 of the Act, which
does not regard insider trading situations, but the manipulation of the securities
market.
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II. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE ITALIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM: THE STATUTE IN ITS CONTEXT
The Act, entitled "Rules Concerning the Use of Nonpublic
Information in Securities Transactions, and the National Com-
mission for Companies and the Securities Exchanges
(CONSOB),"9 for the first time in Italian history directly ad-
dresses insider trading, regulating it as a criminal offense. The
Act implements the European Insider Trading Directive (Direc-
tive or Insider Trading Directive), the aim of which is to
"coordinat[e] regulations on insider dealing."" The Directive
9. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, at 1241. Before this law was passed, a
few existing provisions dealt indirectly with insider trading situations. Among
them, it is worth mentioning the following: article 2622 of the Civil Code prohibits
company directors, officers, internal auditors, and liquidators from using, for their
own or another's profit, any information obtained by reason of their office, unless
there is a justifying motive, if the fact may cause harm to the company. Codice
civile [C.C.] art. 2622. Along the same lines, article 15 of the Presidential Decree
of Mar. 31, 1975, No. 136, art. 15, Gazz. Uff. (May 7, 1975, No. 119), 61 Lex Part
I, at 736, 743, regulating listed companies' external auditing, prohibits the direc-
tors and employees of the auditing company to take advantage of information ac-
quired in the course of their activity and concerning the audited company. Both
provisions were deemed insufficient to ensure protection against insider trading
phenomena both from a substantive point of view (they are designed to protect the
interest of the company whose securities are traded, and not the market as a
whole), and from a procedural point of view (prosecution is only possible if the
allegedly damaged company files a complaint). As a supposed measure of preven-
tion, article 17 of the Law of June 7, 1974, No. 216, art. 17, Gazz. Uff. (June 8,
1974, No. 149), 60 Lex Part I, at 1481, 1491, requires directors, internal auditors,
and officers of listed companies to file with CONSOB a quarterly statement of
their shareholdings in the company and any subsequent variation. Article 326 of
the Italian Criminal Code prohibits civil servants from using, for their own or
another's profit, information acquired in the course of their office which is sup-
posed to remain secret. Codice penale [C.P.] art. 326, 3. The scope of the provi-
sion is quite limited since it only covers offenses committed by civil servants or
public functionaries. See Francesco Mucciarelli, L'art. 326, 3o co. c.p. e l'insider
trading: un'anticipazione consapevole?, in 18 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 310
(1991). Lastly, article 622 of the Italian Criminal Code prohibits the use of infor-
mation protected by professional secrecy, when such use may cause damage. C.P.
art. 622. However, the prosecution of the offense is subject to the filing of a com-
plaint by the allegedly damaged person. Id.
10. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, at 30. Several comments were
issued on the European Insider Trading Directive. See BERNHARD BERGMANS, IN-
SIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIEs TRADING 66-95 (1991); Giuseppe Carcano, La
direttiva CEE sull', insider trading ,, 34 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 1026 (1989); Giu-
seppe Carriero, L'insider trading nella disciplina comunitaria, LE SocIETA 581
(1990); Hazen, supra note 4; EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1991); Luigi Solimena, La direttiva sull'insider trading, 16
GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 1054 (1989).
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requires Member States to take the appropriate regulatory
measures" to deter persons holding inside information from
trading in securities. The Directive does not require the use of
"criminal" enforcement, rather, it was intended to foster
investors' confidence in the operations of the securities market,
in keeping with the establishment and functioning of the inter-
nal European Union (EU) market. The issuance of the Di-
rective was designed to force countries that had no specific
regulation of insider trading, mainly Germany and Italy, to
adopt one. 3
However, even before any Directive was issued, the need
for an insider trading law in Italy had been greatly publicized,
both among practitioners and academics, 4 as one means of
11. The regulatory measures must be "sufficient to promote compliance ...
Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 13.
12. Id. pmbl. paras. 5-10. The purpose of the Directive, as in its nature (in
light of articles 100A and 189 of the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECO-
NOMIC COmMUNrrY [EEC TREATY]), is to give the European Union Member States
a common and harmonized background in terms of the facts to regulate, by setting
a mi-nimum standard. The Member States are then required to set up the actual
regulatory and enforcement system as it best fits within their own general legisla-
tive framework, although they are free to adopt more restrictive measures as long
as such greater severity is of general application, without any resultant discrimi-
nation. See Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 6.
13. See id. pmbl. para. 13. Within the European Community, France has had
specific insider trading legislation ever since 1970. Law of Dec. 23, 1970, No. 70-
1208, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] (Dec. 24, 1970, at 11,891),
Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, LUgislation [D.S.J 1971, at 17. In the United Kingdom insid-
er trading was initially made a criminal offense in the Companies Act of 1980.
Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73 (Eng.). After the issuance of the Insider
Trading Directive, the relevant legislation, scattered among many statutes, was
reassembled in Part V of the Criminal Justice Act of 1993. Criminal Justice Act,
1993, ch. 36, §§ 52-64. For a general overview of insider trading regulation in
Europe, see INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE (Gerhard Wegen & Heinz-Diet-
er Assmann eds., 1994).
14. Clearly evidencing such interest, the Italian literature concerning insider
trading was quite voluminous, and it especially focused on the experience of those
countries that had already developed a body of law on the matter (hence, mainly,
the United States). See Riccardo Alessi, ?Market egalitarianism e vinsider tradingo
25 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 942 (1980); Giorgio Baldini, L'illecito deU'insider
nell'ordinamento italiano, in LE SocIETA 729 (1990); Stefano Ballarini, La
regolamentazione dell'insider trading nel Regno Unito, 89 RIVISTA DEL DIRITIO
COMMERCIALE 163 (1991); Stefano Ballarini, Insider trading: problemi attuali e
profili di comparazione, in CONTRATIO E IMPRESA 1160 (1990); ANDREA BARTALENA,
L'ABUSO DI INFORMAZIONI PRIVILEGIATE (1989); Armando Bartulli, Profili penali
dell'. insider trading ,, 34 RiVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 988 (1989); Marco Campanelli,
L'insider trading, in BANCA, BORSA E TITOLI DI CREDITO 768 (1988); Giuseppe
Carcano, c Insider trading > e analisti finanziari in una sentenza statunitense, 30
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encouraging the growth of the Italian securities market. Two
factors ultimately led to a thorough revision of the Italian
financial regulatory framework: 1) the greater diffusion of
securities ownership among the general investing public; 5
and 2) the liberalization of capital movements within the Euro-
pean Community (EC).6 As a result, several statutes were
passed creating a modern legal framework for the Italian fi-
nancial market: 1) the Investment Business Act came to regu-
late the securities business and broker-dealer activities;'7 2)
the Takeover Act regulated takeovers and public offers of secu-
rities;" and 3) the Banking Acts of 1992'" and 199320 gave
full implementation to the Second EC Banking Directive2'
and allowed credit institutions to enter the securities business,
thus breaking down the commercial bank/investment bank
legal distinction. Some of these laws are currently under re-
RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 722 (1985); Giuseppe Carriero, 11 problema dell'<insider
trading,, Foro It. IV 146 (1988); Paolo Casella, Alcune osservazioni in tema di
insider trading, 16 GIURIsPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 796 (1989); Diego Corapi, Inside
Information e Insider Trading: prospettive di intervento legislativo, in
L'INFORMAZIONE SOCIETARIA (1982); Stefano Gall, // caso TomW e la repressione
dell'insider trading negli Stati Uniti, 14 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 716 (1987);
Stefano Gall, Novitd sull'insider trading: due recenti sentenze americane, un
progetto legislativo della SEC, la modifica al codice penale svizzero e la direttiva
CEE, 15 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 282 (1988); Leonardo Mazza, La
repressione dell'insider trading nel quadro della tutela del mercato azionario, in
BANCA, BORSA E TITOLI DI CREDITO 673 (1988); SERGIO SEMINARA, INSIDER TRADING
E DIRITTO PENALE (1989).
15. Between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of Italian households' financial
portfolios invested in stocks doubled from 10% to 19.9% (21.3% if mutual funds
holdings are taken into account). CONFINDUSTRIA, PREVISIONI DELL'ECONONMIA
ITALIANA: RISPARMIO, CAPITALE DI RISCEIO E MERCATO AZIONARIO 91 (1993). The
policy currently pursued by government authorities to privatize most of the very
large state-owned industries is also intended to widen the presence of public inves-
tors on the securities market.
16. Council Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L178) 5 prohibits any restriction to
capital movements between Member States. More recently, the Treaty on European
Union codified this prohibition as an article of the treaty. TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, art. 73(b).
17. Law of Jan. 2, 1991, No. 1, Gazz. Uff. (Jan. 4, 1991, No. 3), 77 Lex Part
I, at 27 [hereinafter Investment Business Act].
18. Law of Feb. 18, 1992, No. 149, Gazz. Uff. (Feb. 21, 1992, No. 43), 78 Lex
Part I, at 866 [hereinafter Takeover Act].
19. Decree-Law of Dec. 14, 1992, No. 481, Gazz. Uff. (Dec. 17, 1992, No. 296),
78 Lex Part I, at 4180.
20. Decree-Law of Sept. 1, 1993, No. 385, Gazz. Uff. (Sept. 30, 1993, No. 230),
79 Lex Part I, at 2557.
21. Second Council Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L386) 1.
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view, either to be harmonized with current EU legislation,22
or to correct any flaws that arose in their day-to-day applica-
tion.
The insider trading statute came within this general revi-
sion, and it suffered, as did most of the other statutes, from
the great deal of rhetoric and demagoguery that accompanied
its issuance. Most of the securities reform laws were passed by
a large majority in Parliament as the result of a general and
diffuse feeling, that soon crystallized into the political slogan:
Any successful development of Italy's financial market would
only be possible if Italy was provided with laws and regula-
tions comparable to the ones in place in countries where the
economy and financial activities seemed to be faring better
than in Italy. Acceptance of this "slogan" affected the regular
course of the legislative process so as to prevent a sufficiently
careful reflection on the necessity, coverage, and implications
of the legislation. Subsequently, the process of remodernizing
the regulatory framework of the financial system was carried
out in a hurried and disorderly manner, often with legislators
having no precise long-term project in mind, thus failing to set
out explicitly the rationale underlying each law or the objec-
tives that were being pursued. Indeed, in a few instances, the
securities statutes were issued in order to implement interests
and powers well beyond and different from their widely publi-
cized purposes.'
22. The Italian legislature is in the process of implementing the Investment
Services Directive, Council Directive 93/22, 1993 O.J. (L141) 27. Article 21 of the
recent Law of Feb. 6, 1996, No. 52, establishes the principles and criteria the
Italian government must abide by in implementing the directive. Law of Feb. 6,
1996, No. 52, Gazz. Uff. (Feb. 10, 1996, No. 34), art. 21.
23. A blatant example can be seen in the Takeover Act, supra note 18. When
issued, it was widely publicized as an instrument of economic democracy, since it
was intended to pursue the objective of equal treatment among shareholders and
the protection of minority shareholders, whereas the actual effect, if any clear one
can be construed, has been to hinder the market for corporate control, making it
more costly to transfer control of companies in the public markets. If the law was
intended to enhance investors' confidence in public markets, this was quite an am-
biguous way of doing it. See generally Rosanna Ricci & Eugenio Ruggiero,
Riflessione per una revisione della disciplina italiana delle offerte pubbliche
d'acquisto, in WORKING PAPERS: DIRiTrO DELL'IMPRESA 331 (1996). Moreover, the
Investment Business Act, supra note 17, regulating financial services and the secu-
rities business, is under close review by the EU Commission. Case 101/94, Com-
mission v. Italy, No. 0835/91 (E.C.J. filed Mar. 22, 1994). In bringing this case
under Article 169 of the EC Treaty, the Commission is accusing Italy of violating
the EU provisions on the right of establishment and on the freedom to provide
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The uncertainty and fragmentation of the overall frame-
work resulted in requests for adaptations.' Also, within such
an uncertain and fragmented framework, the government
agencies entrusted with the enforcement of these laws risk
being either too discretionary or undereffective, or both. The
statutes themselves were written in a confused manner-many
of the terms were adopted without providing legal definition,
thereby rendering interpretative answers difficult even to sug-
gest.'
Moreover, the confusion and uncertainty caused by the
flaws in the legislative process gave rise to doubts about the
effectiveness of the securities laws in view of the legislative
decision to criminalize the insider trading phenomenon. On the
one hand, there is the extreme gravity of the criminal sanction
to be pursued and imposed for a violation of the statute-im-
prisonment or fine, and interdiction from public or corporate
offices." On the other hand, the rigidity brought about by
criminal enforcement, in view of its obviously greater attention
to a strict application of the rule of law, greatly reduces the
opportunity for administrative enforcement action.' Further-
more, CONSOB, the Italian government's enforcement agency
services. EC TREATY, arts. 52, 59. See Maria C. Malaguti, La legge 2 gennaio
1991, n. 1 (SDI) a veramente incompatibile con il diritto comunitario sulla libera
prestazione di servizi?, in CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 650 (1993).
24. The clearest example of the short-sightedness of the legislature is the
current situation in the Italian securities market: despite the legislative effort, the
market underwent hardly any of the development that was supposed to follow the
enactment of the reform laws. The securities market basically remains a very
speculative and risky environment which best fits the needs of sophisticated and
professional investors, and scares away the public at large. See generally GUSTAVO
VISENTINI, L'EVOLUZIONE DEL SISTEMA FINANZIARIO ITALIANO. I PROBLEMI ATIUALI.
LA LEGAL1TA NELL'ORGANIZZAZIONE DELL'ECONOMIA. ETICA E AFFARI (1995). It is
evident, however, that a very important factor in determining the situation in the
securities market, regardless of the quality of the laws in place, is the large
amount of high-yield public debt, crowding out most possibilities of investment in
private finance. Id. at 31.
25. One commentator, while praising the legislature's efforts in trying to regu-
late and repress insider trading behaviors, points out that the technical design of
the Insider Trading Act may end up "frustrating any underlying noble intentions"
Giovanni M. Flick, L'insider trading. Profili giuridici, 3 ECONOMIA E DIRITrO DEL
TERZIARIO 699, 711 (1991).
26. The insider will be subject to fine or imprisonment, and will be disquali-
fied from holding public or corporate offices. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1,
art. 2, 5.
27. For a broad overview of the Italian criminal system, see generally ETORE
GIANNANTONIO, ITALIAN LEGAL INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 17-22 (1984).
1996]
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responsible for the supervision of the securities markets, main-
tains some relevant powers of investigation and collection of
evidence. However, should a prima facie allegation of insider
trading arise, the results must then be immediately passed on
to the competent judicial prosecuting authority.'
In the United States, insider trading is also a criminal of-
fense.29 However, the U.S. system allows greater flexibility
with enforcement policies, mainly because criminal prosecution
is discretionary, whereas in Italy it is mandatory. The U.S.
enforcement agency, the SEC, can consequently utilize a wider
scope of tools for the repression of the phenomenon, since it
can choose to seek equitable30 or administrative3 relief, thus
profiting from the lower burden of proof standards and the
tempering of the sanction.
III. THE CONTENT OF THE INSIDER TRADING ACT
The structure of the Insider Trading Act centers upon the
definition of the typical insider trading situation. Article 2,
paragraph I prohibits a person from trading securities if he or
she possesses material nonpublic information acquired as an
"insider," that is, by virtue of holding shares in a company or
by reason of the exercise of a function, even a public one, or of
a profession or office (the insider trading prohibition).32
Related crimes are then set out in order to grant greater
28. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 8, 3.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994).
30. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1972), reh'g denied 404 U.S. 1064 (1972); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1994).
31. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 917-18 (1961). In the exer-
cise of its administrative powers, however, the SEC's jurisdiction is limited to
registered broker-dealers and members of national securities exchanges. See Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1994).
32. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, % 1. Two further provisions of
the Act attempt to prevent insider trading by posing a general prohibition to trade
securities in special instances when the material nonpublic information is still at
its formative stage. The Act stipulates that company directors, internal and exter-
nal auditors, officers, managers, company liquidators, and controlling shareholders
are not allowed to trade when a meeting of the board of directors has been called
to resolve upon material issues until the moment the resolution is made public.
Id. art. 2, q 3. Similarly, government Ministers and Undersecretaries of State can-
not trade any of the securities that may be affected by the adoption of resolutions
in the agenda of government meetings that have already been convoked, until the
resolution is publicly disclosed. Id. art. 2, % 7.
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effectiveness to the insider trading prohibition. Article 2, para-
graph 2 prohibits the communication to third parties of any
material nonpublic information by one who obtained the infor-
mation through his or her position, unless there is a justifica-
tion (the tipping prohibition).33 Moreover, insiders are prohib-
ited from recommending that third parties effect any securities
transaction, when such recommendation is based upon materi-
al nonpublic information possessed by the insider (the recom-
mendation prohibition).' The tipping and recommendation
prohibitions were deemed essential to avoid easy circumven-
tions or loopholes in the operation of the central insider trad-
ing provision.'
Furthermore, all of the above prohibitions (trading, tip-
ping, recommending) apply to "tippees," that is, to those per-
sons that acquired, directly or indirectly, the relevant
nonpublic information from insiders (tippers) who possess the
information because of their function, profession or office (the
tippee prohibition)."
According to the Act, the insider's conduct, when he is in
possession of material nonpublic information, will be illegal in
the following instances: a) should he purchase or sell or effect
any other transaction, also through the interposition of a per-
son, on securities; b) should he communicate the material
nonpublic information to third parties, without any justifica-
tion; c) should he recommend to third parties, based upon the
material nonpublic information, that they effect securities
transactions (without disclosing the information to them, how-
ever).
In the latter two instances, it is not essential that there be
trading for the offense to be completed. The insider will be
33. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 2.
34. Id.
35. Moreover, a further provision in the Act, article 5, defines and punishes
the manipulation of the securities market. Id. art. 5.
36. Id. art. 2, 4. An express exemption from the law is provided for in
article 4 of the Act. No insider trading violation can be claimed against the Italian
State, the Bank of Italy, the Italian Foreign Exchange Office or any person acting
on their behalf for reasons connected with monetary or foreign exchange policy, or
the management of public debt or official reserves. Id. art. 4.
37. See Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 2. Conversely, under the
trading prohibition of a), insider non-trading, although possibly as blameworthy as
insider trading, is outside the reach of the law. Thus, the insider will not be ac-
countable if he revokes a purchase order after learning about negative nonpublic
1996] 165
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liable for merely tipping the information or recommending the
transaction, regardless of whether any trading takes place.
Therefore, whether or not the tippee or the person receiving
the recommendation trades on the basis of the tip or the rec-
ommendation, the insider will still be liable.'
By comparison, under American law, any violation of Rule
10b-5 must be "in connection with the purchase or sale of secu-
rities."39 If trading does not take place, a charge under Rule
10b-5 cannot be brought, the rationale being that there is no
harm to the market. The irrelevance of trading in the tipping
and recommending prohibitions in Italian law is probably
founded on the idea that these deterrents will inhibit or at
least reduce the risk that anybody will actually trade on inside
information.
In the trading prohibition, the incidental phrase "also
through the interposition of a person" enlarges the scope of the
illegal conduct to include any securities transaction which the
insider initiates, even though he may not be the ultimate bene-
ficiary. Since in the Italian legal system criminal liability is
only personal and does not apply to companies or legal entities,
this extension allows the Act to reach the frequent cases where
the trading is made to the advantage of companies or other
legal persons, and not by insiders in their individual capaci-
ties. Therefore, the corporate veil is no excuse if insiders initi-
ate or take part in the decision process that leads their compa-
ny to trade securities about which they hold privileged infor-
mation. The insider will be held liable even though it is ulti-
mately the company that benefits from the use of the inside
information."
information concerning the securities he was intending to buy.
38. The only exemption applies to the insider's tipping the nonpublic infor-
mation when there is a justification. Id. art. 2, q 2. The justification exemption is
intended to apply to situations where it can be expected to be regular practice
that information is transferred during the course of one's function, profession or
office (e.g., where a director discloses the information to an auditor, or to an in-
vestment banker). Therefore, it is not limited to hypotheses where there is a duty
to disclose or, conversely, a right to know.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
40. The Act is concerned with "behaviors" and not with "results." In order for
the trading prohibition to apply, the decision to trade must be tainted by the
possession of privileged information, since that is what affects the correct function-
ing of the price mechanism and the allocation of financial resources. More general-
ly, for the conduct to be illegal, there is no requirement that the insider must per-
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However, the actual role played by the insider in the deci-
sion making process may vary the statutory sources of liability.
If the insider holds a corporate office that allows him to make
decisions as to the company's transactions in securities, he will
be subject to liability under the central insider trading prohibi-
tion. The same result will occur if the decision as to the pur-
chase or sale of securities accrues to the board of directors, or
other committee in which the insider actively participates.4' If
this is not the case, the source of the insider's liability will
instead shift to the recommendation prohibition. Thus, if his
position within the corporate structure does not allow the in-
sider to make the final decision, but he participates in the
process leading to that decision, by giving advice or sugges-
tions, while relying on nonpublic information, liability will at-
tach.42
Finally, articles 6 through 9 of the Act grant regulatory
and investigatory powers to CONSOB for the enforcement of
the law.43 However, none of the Act's provisions expressly ad-
dress the issue of the insider's civil liability. Nonetheless, a
private right of action accruing to persons harmed by the ille-
gal behavior of insiders is construed from the existing general
contract law, and from the "open" tort system which entitles
anyone suffering an unjust harm recovery against whomever
committed the tortious action.44
sonally gain a profit from the transactions he initiates, either by trading, tipping
or recommending.
41. It is irrelevant whether the director has notified the other members of the
board of the inside information when assessing the director's individual liability.
However, notification will force the other directors to abstain from trading as well,
since they gathered the information in the exercise of their directoral office.
42. Cesare Pedrazzi, Riflessioni su/l'insider trading in ambito corporativo, 36
RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 1661, 1668-69 (1991).
43. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, arts. 6-9. CONSOB's regulatory powers
under the insider trading statute are basically addressed at ensuring that informa-
tion is timely delivered to the market. The underlying philosophy is that trading
on inside information is less likely to occur if the information stays inside for the
least amount of time. Andrea Bartalena, BI regolamento Consob in tema di insider
trading, in 1 BANCA BORSA E TITOLI DI CREDITO 239, 240 (1992).
44. C.c. art. 2043. The American experience prior to the enactment of § 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, imposing insiders' liability to contempora-
neous traders, shows how difficult it may be to assert insiders' liability on com-
mon law tort or contract grounds. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994). Those same problems and difficulties, in terms of causation
and reliance, are altogether present in Italian law. Carriero, supra note 14, at
160-63; Guido Santoro, Insider Trading: profili civilistici, in CONTRATrO E IMPRESA
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IV. THE DEFINITION OF THE "INSIDER" IN ITALY
The definition of an insider in Italian law is very broad.
An insider is any person possessing material nonpublic infor-
mation whenever such possession is the consequence of owning
shares in a company, or of carrying out a function (including a
public function), profession or office.45 The insider is prohibit-
ed from trading, from tipping the nonpublic information unless
there is a justification, and from recommending any transac-
tions to third parties relying on the inside information."
The statutory definition of insider makes no specific refer-
ence to corporate positions, such as directorships or
officerships. The law is written in general terms to include any
professional or employment activity,' regardless of any spe-
cific duties attached to it, whether the activity implies any
duty of confidentiality,48 or whether it is carried out in rela-
tionship to the issuer of the security affected by the informa-
tion.49 Even when the nonpublic information is acquired by
being a shareholder, the trading prohibition applies with no
concern for any special connection between the shareholder
and the company such as, for example, the relationship be-
tween a controlling shareholder and the company. The share
ownership may be of any proportion, a minority one as well.
Thus, one may then be an insider if he or she only owns a
single share of a company and, as a consequence of that owner-
663, 671-ss (1992).
45. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 1.
46. Id. art. 2, 9 1-2.
47. Function, profession, and office are by no means "terms of art" in this
field of law specifying precise categories of persons-they should thus be given
their general common meaning.
48. Indeed, it is the law under review that actually imposes a duty of confi-
dentiality barring the insider from transferring the information to anyone, unless
there is a justified reason for doing so. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2,
2.
49. The lack of any required linkage between the activity exercised by the
insider and the issuer of the security affected by the information seems to be
confirmed by the express recognition, as possible insiders, of public functionaries.
Solimena has a different view. In examining the equivalent provision in the Insid-
er Trading Directive, he argues that the definition of "insider" should be interpret-
ed to include only individuals acquiring the nonpublic information while working
in a relationship with the issuer to whom the information refers. The acquisition
of information regarding securities and issuers other than the one the alleged
insider is working for should instead make him a tippee. Solimena, supra note 10,
at 1058-59.
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ship, he or she gains inside information. Indeed, for the trad-
ing prohibition to apply, it is not even necessary that the secu-
rities the nonpublic information affects, and the shareholder
trades upon, be those issued by the company in which the
shareholder owns shares." This seems to confirm that, for the
purposes of applying the Act's prohibitions, the position of the
insider (shareholding, exercise of a function, profession or of-
fice) is only relevant because it permits the acquisition of the
material nonpublic information, and not because any duties
(confidentiality, loyalty, etc.) arise from that position.
The Act seems to reach even further when combining the
definition of the insider, to whom the prohibitions are ad-
dressed, with the definition of the tippee, to whom those same
prohibitions apply.5  A tippee's acquisition of material
nonpublic information, directly or indirectly obtained from an
insider, imposes a duty upon the tippee to abstain from trading
the securities affected by that information, when the tippee is
aware of the materiality and non-publicity of the informa-
tion.52 By combining the two provisions-the central insider
50. When defining the insider for this purpose, in fact, the statute says
"shareholder of a company", it does not say "shareholder of the company." Insider
Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 1. Although some commentators have looked
to parliamentary reports to argue that this is an error by the legislature, which
really wanted to include only the shareholders of the company to which the
nonpublic information refers, that is not how the statute was written. See Stefano
Gal, Insider trading: un primo commento, 18 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 928,
932 (1991); Alessandra Rossi Vannini, La legge 17 maggio 1991, n. 157:
destinatari dei divieti di insider trading, tipping e tuyautage. L'estensione dei
divieti, 35 RIVISTA 1TALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA PENALE 276, 278 (1992) (as-
serting that the language in the statute was a last minute oversight and that the
legislative intent was to refer to "the company"). However, the Act's wording would
encompass as an insider the shareholder of a company who, knowing that his
company is going to take over another company, trades the stock of the target
company before the tender offer is officially publicized.
51. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 4.
52. Id. The tippee inherits the same duties as the insider that originally
tipped the information. Besides being prohibited from trading, the tippee cannot
further tip the information or recommend the making of transactions relying on
the information. Id. art. 2, 4. This provision is even broader than the require-
ment of the Insider Trading Directive, which only extends the trading prohibition,
and not the tipping or the recommendation prohibitions, to tippees. Insider Trad-
ing Directive, supra note 1, art. 4. Moreover, as a clear example of the very poor
drafting of the Italian statute, it should be noted that, for no apparent reason, the
prohibitions do not apply to all tippees but only to those that receive the inside
information from tippers possessing the information "by reason of the exercise of
their function, profession or office." Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 4.
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trading prohibition and the tippee trading prohibition-the
result seems to be that anyone holding material, nonpublic,
inside information respecting a security must abstain from
trading in that security,53 because material nonpublic infor-
mation can always be traced back to an inside source and can
"indirectly" reach anyone.'
Commentators have attempted to restrict such a broad
interpretation of the insider definition by implying a causal
link between the inside position and the acquisition of the
information. According to this interpretation," the alleged
insider would be prohibited from trading only if he acquired
the nonpublic information as a direct consequence of his inside
position, not as an incident to it. For example, the external
auditor that overhears the conversation concerning a planned
takeover between two officers of the company while eating at
the company's cafeteria would not fall under the insider trad-
ing prohibition because he receives the information apart from
Thus defined, the source of the information for the tippee (the tipper) is different
from the definition of insider in q 1 of article 2 of the Act, since it leaves out the
shareholder and, probably, the public fimctionary. Therefore, under the Italian law,
if one receives a tip from the shareholder of a company or from a public function-
ary, he will be able to legitimately trade, tip or recommend with impunity. Never-
theless, the shareholder and the public functionary will still be liable for violating
the tipping prohibition unless they can claim the justification exemption. Id. art. 2,
91 2; see discussion supra note 38.
53. Armando Bartulli & Mario Romano, Sulla disciplina penale dell'insider
trading (/egge 17 maggio 1991, n. 157), 19 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 660, 661
(1992).
54. The language of the Insider Trading Directive in this respect seemed even
more explicit, since article 4 of the Directive requires that the prohibition to trade
apply to any person who "with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside infor-
mation, the direct or indirect source of which could not be other than a person re-
ferred to in Article 2," i.e., an insider. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art.
4; see also id. art. 2. However, the different language used by the Italian statute,
"directly or indirectly obtained . . . from [an insider]," may possibly lead to restrict
the literal scope of the notion of tippee that is apparently very wide. Insider Trad-
ing Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 91 4. It may, in fact, be argued that the scienter
required for the offense comprises knowledge of the identity of the original insider-
tipper. The "indirect" tipping through which the tippee acquires the material
nonpublic information would then have to be known to the tippee through all its
passages from the original inside source. One commentator notes that knowledge
of the original inside source of the information is an essential requirement for
evaluating the awareness of the tippee as to the materiality of the information
itself. Sergio Seminara, L'insider trading nella prospettiva penalistica, 19
GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 637, 647 (1992).
55. Circolare Assonime n. 78/1991, 36 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA, 883, 884 (1991)
[hereinafter Circolare Assonime].
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the exercise of his proper functions. The fact that he is audit-
ing that company's accounts gave him the "occasion" to hear
the information, but it was not the "proximate cause" of his
acquisition of the information. On the other hand, following
the same argument, should he learn about the planned take-
over reading a memo included in the company's accounts he is
auditing, he would then be prohibited from trading because in
this case there would be a causal connection between the func-
tion carried out and the acquisition of the nonpublic informa-
tion.
However, this restrictive interpretation seems to be sterile.
Even assuming that it may be successfully argued that the
auditor learning of the information overhearing the officers'
conversation does not become an insider under article 2, para-
graph 1 (in the absence of any strictly causal linkage between
the function carried out and the acquisition of the nonpublic
information), he would not escape liability as a tippee under
paragraph 4 of article 2. Hence, the prohibition against trading
would altogether apply to him. Moreover, the practical irrele-
vance of envisaging the two different interpretations is further
confirmed by the fact that either violation, as an insider or as
a tippee, carries the same penalty.56
V. THE DEFINITION OF THE "INSIDER" IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. experience concerning insider trading developed
through leading court decisions that centered upon the signifi-
cance and operative meaning of Rule 10b-5,57 issued by the
SEC in implementation of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.58 Section 10(b) is a general anti-fraud
56. Article 2, 5, in fact, imposes exactly the same penalties to insiders and
tippees who violate any of the provisions of the law, whether they trade the con-
cerned securities, tip the confidential information or recommend the making of
transactions in reliance on the inside information. Insider Trading Act, supra note
1, art. 2, 5. The use of such indiscriminate sanctioning techniques, where the
penalties do not reflect the possibly different gravity of the offense in view of the
danger posed to investors' protection, is surely deplorable. Seminara, supra note
54, at 647-48; Giovanni M. Flick, Insider trading: una tappa signiflcativa - anche
se controversa - della lunga marcia verso la trasparenza, 36 RiVISTA DELLE SOCIETA
975, 993 (1991).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). The
only attempt to strictly define insider trading is SEC Rule 14e-3, forbidding trad-
ing in securities when in possession of material nonpublic information in the con-
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clause that protects investors dealing in securities from the use
of manipulative and deceptive devices. 9 The implementing
rule, 10b-5(c), prohibits a person from engaging "in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."0 This rule is the basis for
insider trading liability in the United States. Thus, the central
element of any offense under the rule is fraud6 ' based upon
manipulation62 or deception.
text of tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)-(b) (1995). However, such a definition
cannot be analogized to other situations because of the context (time-wise and
legislation-wise) in which it was issued. In fact, the SEC issued Rule 14e-3 in
1980, in the raging aftermath of the Chiarella case. Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980); see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. The legal justi-
fication of SEC Rule 14e-3 finds its roots in the full disclosure environment per-
meating tender offers pursuant to the Williams Act. V1lliams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 558-59 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting
that Rule 14e-3 was originally enacted as part of the Williams Act and thus was
part of its overall disclosure provisions), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is also concerned with insider trading situa-
tions, although it only imposes a civil sanction. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994). It states that short-swing profits made by 10%
shareholders, directors or officers by trading, within a period of six months, the
shares of their corporation are recoverable by the issuer. Id. Moreover, a few in-
sider trading convictions have been upheld on the basis of legislation that does not
specifically deal with securities, such as the mail and wire fraud statutes or the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1994). However, since insider trading is somehow a "collateral accident" to
such statutes, they will not be the subject of this article.
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section
10(b) states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . to use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1995).
61. The words of Justice Powell in delivering the opinion of the Court for the
Chiarella case are quite meaningful: "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall
provision, but what it catches must be fraud." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35.
62. In the context of securities dealing, "manipulation" means the creation of
a false market for any traded security, which is reflected in its price becoming
partially or completely detached from its underlying economic value. Take, for
example, the disclosure of a company's annual accounts shows a profit in order to
attract greater demand for its securities, whereas the business of the firm is actu-
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In the specific case of insider trading, Rule 10b-5 implies
that the offender has engaged in fraudulent, i.e, deceptive,
action in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.63
The deception lies in the failure to disclose the information and
abstain from improperly using it in connection with trading. To
be actionable, deception requires breach of a duty.' The duty
may involve the "typical" insider owing a fiduciary duty to
other investors65 (the fiduciary duty theory), or it may involve
a duty to the source of the information arising from contract66
or from the particular nature of the trader's relationship with
the source itself (the misappropriation or fraud-on-the-source
theory). 7 The illegitimacy of the trader's behavior is then in-
ferred from the deceptive process, involving the breach of a
duty arising from a specific relationship, eventually leading to
the informational advantage."
ally operating at a loss; or the creation of an apparently active market, often
through the use of wash sales. Instead of manipulating the market, the trader
with inside information tries to anticipate the market's movements by exploiting
information not yet available to the rest of the market. GIUSEPPE ZADRA,
STRUTrURE E REGOLAMENTAZIONE DEL MERCATO MOBILIARE 63-66 (2d ed. 1995); see
also Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation"
in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
64. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
65. For example, directors have a fiduciary duty to the company's sharehold-
ers. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 834 (2d Cir. 1967).
66. An example is an employment manual that encompasses the firm's inter-
nal regulations and express policies. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986) (policy manual requiring employees to treat nonpublic
information learned on the job as confidential), affg by an equally divided Court
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
67. An example is the psychiatristfclient relationship. United States v. Willis,
737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss indictment of psychi-
atrist who traded on the basis of information obtained from patient, in breach of
duty arising from relationship of trust and confidence).
68. In describing the current state of the American law, I have put myself in
the position of the attorney counselling his client about safe harbors for trading on
inside information. From this perspective, the insider's breach of duty toward the
source of material nonpublic information (the misappropriation theory) is to be
considered the basis for fraud under SEC Rule 10b-5 since, although there is not
yet any Supreme Court decision on the matter, the theory has been accepted by
several circuit and district court decisions. See, e.g., Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1024;
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d
403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Rothberg v.
Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987);
Willis, 737 F. Supp. at 271-72. However, the issue is still under debate since the
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The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the previous position
of the SEC according to which it was forbidden to trade on the
basis of mere possession of nonpublic material information. 9
On that assumption, the SEC had extended the well known
"disclose or abstain" doctrine to anyone who merely held inside
information and traded on it. The SEC believed it was harmful
to the market, and fraudulent, for anyone to trade while in a
privileged position due to the holding of material information
which other investors did not have."°
The rationale of U.S. law seems to be the protection of the
market from fraudulent devices such as traders using privi-
leged positions to gain an informational advantage. Trading on
material nonpublic information, per se, is not the object of the
law. Instead, the object of the law is to prohibit the setting up
of fraudulent schemes designed to allow the insider to trade
securities and gain a profit from the use of the inside informa-
tion. The fraud lies in either the improper receipt of the infor-
mation or in the misuse of properly received information by the
insider through any relationship in which a duty exists. Unless
some breach of duty occurs, no fraud can be found in the fact
that an insider actually trades, nor in the insider's mere pos-
session and use of the material nonpublic information." Thus,
Supreme Court evenly split when reviewing it in the Carpenter case. Carpenter,
484 U.S. at 24. Indeed, very recently, the misappropriation theory has been reject-
ed as a basis for securities fraud under Rule lOb-5 by two decisions of the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995). A similarly cautious
approach is being followed in examining the Italian statute.
69. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
70. This was also the position supported by the government in Chiarella. 445
U.S. at 235-36. In a broad sense, that position, extending the holdings of In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SE.C. 907 (1961), and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), reflected the attempt to apply the developing doctrine
of contractual fraudulent deceit to impersonal market transactions. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts establishes that a party's nondisclosure of a material
fact is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist if the person "knows
that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic
assumption on which the party is making the contract .... ." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981). See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs,
§§ 6.3-.4, at 401-14 (2d ed. 1990).
71. A fairly clear idea of the current state of U.S. insider trading law under
Rule 10b-5 can be extrapolated from three cases: Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222; Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); and Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1024. In Chiarella, the
Supreme Court refused to uphold a securities fraud conviction on the grounds that
a failure to disclose imposed a duty to abstain from trading directed to anyone
holding material nonpublic information. 445 U.S. at 236-37. The Court held that
[Vol. MXI:
1996] INSIDER TRADING IN ITALY
for example, an insider will be liable when he is given access
to material non-public information for a specific purpose (typi-
cally, though not necessarily, a corporate purpose), but he
disposes of it for a different purpose in breach of a duty. 2
At this point, the different perspective adopted by Ameri-
can law compared with the Italian law seems evident. Ameri-
can law is aimed at ensuring a level playing field among inves-
tors in terms of honesty of behavior in the collection of infor-
mation. Hence, under American law, trading will be limited
only if based upon information that has been fraudulently
gathered. Italian law, instead, shifts the focus to the exact
insider trading activity is free and that the only limitation imposed by the law is
the use of fraudulent devices. Id. at 234. In this respect, the non-disclosure of
material nonpublic information constitutes fraudulent conduct only in presence of a
duty to disclose arising from an existing "relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween parties to a transaction." Id. at 230. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opin-
ion argued in favor of finding fraud on grounds of misappropriation of information
belonging to the source of the information. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
However, the majority held that the merits of the Chief Justice's argument could
not be legitimately reviewed by the Court because to do so would have exceeded
the limits of the petitioning. See id. at 237 n.21 (citing United States v. Gallagher,
576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (3d Cir. 1978); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32
(1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931)). The principle set
forth in Chiarella was further strengthened in the Dirks case and was extended to
tippees. Again, the Court held that mere possession of inside information is not
sufficient grounds for finding fraud in the trading taking place on that basis, even
when the trader knows the information comes from an inside source. Dirks, 463
U.S. at 653-54. The Supreme Court recognized the great importance of a free flow
of information for the preservation of a healthy market, to be limited only by
fraudulent conduct forbidden under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 658-59.
Hence, the tippee who trades on the basis of nonpublic information received from
an inside source will only be liable when the receipt of the information is "improp-
er;" that is, when the information has been fraudulently tipped in breach of the
insider's fiduciary duty. The test to ascertain the insider's breach of duty in tip-
ping the information is one of purpose-in other words, "whether the insider per-
sonally benefit[s], directly or indirectly [from the tipping]." Id. at 662. When this
occurs, the tippee inherits the insider-tipper's breach, and they both collude in the
fraudulent scheme. However, it is worth noting that the wider the interpretation
of "personal benefit," the more far-reaching the scope of the fraud and, conversely,
the narrower the leeway for the legitimate flow of information. Finally, in Carpen-
ter,- the Second Circuit affirmed the misappropriation theory. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
at 1026. Consistent with prior case law, the court confirmed that a Rule 10b-5
issue can be raised only where fraud is evident. The peculiarity of the decision is
that in the instant case, fraud, although still finalized to the purchase or sale of
securities, is construed upon the trader breaching a duty to the source of the
material nonpublic information, as opposed to the countertraders as was the case
in Chiarella and Dirks.
72. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
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moment the trading takes place. If, at that moment, the trader
has information that is unavailable to the market, no matter
how legitimately the information was acquired, the prohibi-
tions will apply. The Italian legislature, then, seems to aim at
ensuring an informational level playing field among investors
tout court. 3
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF "INTENT"
Italian law circumscribes the criminal liability of the insid-
er by requiring the insider's scienter as to the existence of the
facts and intentionality to engage in the illegal behavior. 4
However, the exact definition of the scienter required for the
completion of the offense raises controversies. The technical
question is whether the intent required by the law is a general
intention to trade securities while in knowing possession of
nonpublic information, i.e., general intent, or whether it is a
specific intention to take advantage and exploit the possessed
material, nonpublic information, i.e., specific intent.75 The
difference is best appreciated by viewing it from the perspec-
73. The Dirks case is a good example of the different operation of the law as
a result of the different approaches taken by the United States and Italy. Dirks, a
financial analyst, was relieved from liability because no fraud was found in his
gathering the inside information that allowed him to trade at an advantage in the
market. Id. at 665. In fact, the insider that tipped the information to Dirks was
not found in breach of any duty in doing so and, hence, no duty to "disclose or
abstain" was transferred to Dirks. Id. at 666-67. However, if Italian law were to
apply to the facts of the case, Dirks would be considered an insider because he
gained the information while exercising his profession as a financial analyst.
Hence, any subsequent trading would be a criminal offense under article 2 of the
Act. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2.
74. Italian criminal law distinguishes two general categories of criminal of-
fenses, "delitti" and "contravvenzioni," according to the type and size of the penalty
that the law will impose. "Delitti" translates roughly as "crimes" and includes
those violations which the law will punish either with imprisonment or fines.
"Contravvenzioni," or misdemeanors, include violations punished either with arrest
or a levy. C.P. arts. 17, 39. The main difference between the categories is the
required proof needed to establish the essential psychological element of the crime.
Behaviors constituting "delitti" can be prosecuted and punished only upon a show-
ing of intent-unless the law expressly states so, there is no space for prosecuting
reckless or negligent behavior. The insider trading law under review prescribes the
penalties of imprisonment and fine, thus making the offenses fall within the cate-
gory of "delitti." Id. art. 2, 9 5. Therefore, absent any contrary provision, commit-
ting any of the prohibited actions is punishable only if intent is proved.
75. In the category of criminal law, the question then becomes whether insid-
er trading is a "general" or "specific" intent offense. FRANCESCO ANTOuSEI & LUIGI
CONTI, MANUALE DI DIRITTO PENALE - PARTE GENERALE 328-29 (1994).
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tive of the prosecution's burden of proof. Should it be concluded
that the insider trading offense requires general intent, the
burden of proof would then be met by showing that the insider
had nonpublic, material information about certain securities
and that, later in time, he traded those securities prior to the
disclosure of the information. In such case, the relationship
between the holding of nonpublic information and the trading
of securities would be a merely chronological one. On the other
hand, requiring specific intent would force the prosecutor to
show that the insider possessed the inside information and
that he precisely relied on it to trade in order to take advan-
tage of the resulting informational asymmetry. In the latter
instance, the relationship between the holding of nonpublic
information and the trading of securities would then be a caus-
al one. '
The difference between the operation of the gener-
al/specific intent hypotheses may appear subtle or captious,
especially because the insider's criminal conduct nevertheless
requires scienter. As a matter of fact, it seems a fair assump-
tion that a knowing and conscious possession of material
nonpublic information concerning specific securities, followed
by trading in those securities, implies the exploitation of the
nonpublic information. However, this may not always be the
case. For example, an insider may sell shares following a pre-
established plan, regardless of any negative information he
may have about the company. Also, in friendly takeover negoti-
ations it is common to disclose specific material information to
the prospective acquiror, for a more correct estimate of the bid-
ding price. In such cases, selective disclosure may be preferred
76. A different issue is presented when an insider misinterprets the nonpublic
information and trades in the opposite direction as he should have in order to
make a profit (e.g., he buys shares thinking that the information, once publicly
disclosed, will have a positive effect on prices, but in fact it turns out the informa-
tion actually has a negative effect). In such a case, the insider should be liable
because there is nothing in the law requiring that the insider actually make a
profit (or avoid a loss) for the offense to be completed. What matters, in the re-
strictive interpretation requiring "specific" intent, is that the insider intended to
make a profit. This is surely the case in the given hypothetical. Other legal sys-
tems, however, take a different approach. Article 161 of the Swiss Criminal Code,
introduced in 1987 to cope with insider trading, punishes the insider only if he
profits from his illegal conduct. Codice penale svizzero [CP] art. 161; see
PESTALOZZI GMuER & HEINZ, BUsINESS GUIDE TO SWITZERLAND i 1140, at 359-60
(1991).
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because general disclosure to the public may possibly harm the
corporation. If general intent were sufficient grounds for as-
serting insider trading liability, any such exchange of material
nonpublic information would prevent the takeover from even-
tually taking place. In that case, it would be no excuse for the
acquiror to show that his price bid was high enough to include
the positive non-publicly disclosed information as well." In
both examples, the lack of any hampering of the securities
market from the insiders' behavior does not seem to justify the
adoption of such restrictive prohibitions, unless one concludes
that what the statute really intended to protect the market
from is the mere danger that any harm may accrue. 8
A literal reading suggests that the Italian Insider Trading
Act adopts the general intent requirement for the insider's
conduct to be illegal. The Act states: "It is prohibited to pur-
chase or sell.., when one is in possession of nonpublic infor-
mation... ,' resulting in a mere chronological connection
between the acquisition of the informational advantage and
the subsequent trading of securities." However, notwith-
standing the letter of the law, an argument in favor of the
specific intent approach may be made on the basis of the Euro-
pean Directive.8 ' The Directive prohibits insiders from "taking
77. Indeed, in a hostile takeover situation, the general intent requirement
would provide target management with a statutory defensive tactic. Disclosure of
an industrial secret to a prospective raider would force him to refrain from any
action with regard to the target company. Should he try to take over the compa-
ny, he might be liable as a tippee of the target company's insiders; should he try
to avoid tippee liability by disclosing the information to the public, he might be
liable for any damage thus possibly caused to the target company.
78. A further possible consequence of the general intent hypothesis is that it
may eventually lead completely to preventing traditional insiders (directors, offi-
cers, members of the supervisory board) from engaging in any trading of securities
issued by their company, since structurally they always possess inside information
about the company.
79. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 2, 1.
80. Galli, supra note 50, at 940; Seminara, supra note 14, at 228; Bartulli,
supra note 14, at 1002-04; Paolo Casella, La legge sulla repressione dell'Insider
Trading, 18 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE 858, 866 (1991). Indeed, the general
intent solution may be fostered by the fact that tipping and recommending are
prohibited regardless of any connected trading, apparently confirming that the law
is concerned with "dangerous" behaviors, rather than with "harmful" behaviors.
Paolo L. Carbone, Nuovi illeciti attinenti alla negoziazione di 'valori mobiliari.
Profili della disciplina. Spunti critici, Foro It. V 466, 477 (1991). According to one
commentator, the apparent lack of any specific intent requirement confers an "ethi-
cal coloring" to the Italian insider trading regulation. Flick, supra note 56, at 986.
81. See Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, % 1. The case law of
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advantage of that [inside] information." " Therefore, the ille-
gality of the insider's conduct would seem to turn on his at-
tempt to profit from the privileged possession of information
where his cause for trading is the awareness that the market
is at a disadvantage against him.8"
VII. MATERIAL NoNPuBLic INFORMATION IN THE ITALIAN
STATUTE
The informational asymmetries covered by the Act are the
ones arising from the possession of material, nonpublic infor-
mation, as defined in article 3.84 Material, nonpublic informa-
tion is any information that: 1) is specific and of a determinate
content; 2) concerns one or more issuers of securities or one or
more securities; 3) has not been made public; and 4) if made
public, would be able to notably influence the price of the con-
cerned securities." The criminal nature of the provision re-
the European Court of Justice has established that judges, in interpreting national
laws, must do so in view of the letter and the purpose of any corresponding direc-
tive, in order to achieve the results pursued by the directive itself. The principle
was recently reaffirmed. Case C-91192, Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, [1995] All ER
(EC) 1 (July 14, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file).
82. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, 1.
83. Despite the very clear language of the text in this respect, the Insider
Trading Directive is not completely immune from ambiguities. On the one hand, in
fact, the Preamble states that "insider dealing involves taking advantage of inside
information," thus seemingly adopting a general intent solution. Insider Trading
Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. % 17. On the other hand, the Preamble recalls cer-
tain transactions, such as market makers in the normal course of their business,
stockbrokers executing clients' orders, and transactions aimed at stabilizing prices,
and states that such practices should not be construed as a per se use of inside
information. See id. These exceptions to the phenomenon seem to give even more
strength to the requirement that the insider actually exploit the inside informa-
tion.
84. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 3. The Italian and EC legislatures
used different terminology concerning the relevant information. Whereas the Italian
insider trading law uses the phrase "nonpublic information," the EC Directive
refers to "inside information" (the Italian official text of the Directive, valid in all
effects, used the term "informazione privilegiata"). In practice, the difference does
not seem to have any material consequence, since both the Directive and the Act
subsequently define the item in substantially the same way. However, the different
qualification may be viewed as a hint of a different approach to the phenomenon
of insider trading: the EC reference to "privilege" seems to indicate a subjective
negative behavior to be connoted in the abuse of a position, whereas the Italian
"nonpublic" reference seems to lead towards the sanction of an objective negative
behavior centered upon the secrecy of the information. Carbone, supra note 80, at
476.
85. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 3.
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quires that the insider have scienter as to the actual existence
of all these characterizing features.
First, the statutorily required "specificity" and "determi-
nate content" qualify information-additional knowledge one
receives-implying that it be precise as to the facts or circum-
stances it concerns, and substantially certain of the happening
and development of the facts or circumstances. As a result of
coming across such qualifying information, a person should be
enriched with facts that he did not, or could not, previously
have known, which favor a more accurate pricing of the con-
cerned security.
Rumors and hearsay should be outside the reach of such
qualification because they are not certain and are subject to
different interpretations and beliefs.86 Similarly, one would
not include within the envisaged notion of nonpublic informa-
tion one's own interpretation and understanding of generally
available data or generally known facts. In such a case, the
information a person possesses does not undergo any quantita-
tive effect, hence, there is no addition to a person's knowledge.
The effect on knowledge from the use of particular analytical
and scientific techniques is a qualitative one, not quantitative,
thus putting already available resources (publicly known infor-
mation) to more efficient use (the accurate pricing of traded
securities). For example, if a fund manager sells all the shares
of a company because he forecasts its crisis after carefully
reviewing the company's financial statements and its product
market developments, and the company actually files for bank-
86. For instance, generic contacts between two companies regarding a possible
merger should not be deemed specific enough until the moment the merger be-
comes substantially and reasonably certain. The law does not expressly state that
the information should be "certain," but such requirement can be inferred from the
seriousness of the limitation on dealing capacity deriving from the holding of such
information, and the gravity of the consequences for its misuse. Bartulli &
Romano, supra note 53, at 670; GALL!, supra note 50, at 955. Galli also notes that
the requirement for the relevant information to be substantially and reasonably
certain can also be inferred from the existence of the special catch-all provisions in
article 2, %% 3 and 7, which prohibit trading immediately prior to a meeting of
the board of directors or of the Council of Ministers (or of some other ministerial
committee). Galli argues, in fact, that should the requirement of "certainty" not
feature the notion of material nonpublic information, the information regarding the
agenda of a meeting would be sufficiently specific enough to forbid any connected
trading under article 2, 9 1. If this were the case, the provisions of article 2, 3
and 7 would be a useless, and hence irrational, repetition of an already existing
prohibition. Id. at 955.
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ruptcy after a while, he may not be deemed to have traded on
inside information. He did not have any new piece of informa-
tion that everybody else did not have as well. Rather, his anal-
yses led to "better" information, not to "greater" information
(where "better" stands for more profitable use of informational
resources, though at parity of amount).,7
Moreover, the "specificity" and "determinate content" re-
quired by the statute should be met if the acquired information
can move the price of the concerned security in a specific given
direction. There does not seem to be a worthy purpose in for-
bidding trading where, although there might be the use of
some nonpublic item of information, there is still a substantial
risk of the stock moving in either direction. For example, the
still-to-be-disclosed information that the board of directors of a
87. This type of reasoning should help resolve the question of whether there
can be insider trading in so-called "scalping" situations. For example, say a person
possesses a reputation in the market for his brilliant guesses as to profitable stock
choices (a so-called financial guru). Experience shows that whenever this person
makes a statement concerning particular stocks, the market price of the stock will
follow his advice and hence move upward if the comment was positive, or down-
ward if the comment was negative. If, before publicizing the statement, the guru
trades the stock and then makes a profit because of the price movements that
follow the disclosure of his statements, could it be construed that he has traded i
on inside information? To be consistent with the interpretation given in the text
above, it should be held that if such behavior is illegal, it would not be considered.
trading on inside information, but rather manipulation of the market. As noted
previously, insider trading laws do not seek to punish or repress the use of great-
er skills and capacities in understanding and interpreting generally available infor-
mation. Thus, in the example given above, the act of publishing a statement dis-
closing the results of one's own analysis should be considered merely incidental,
since in the long run the market would have reached a similar conclusion anyway
if the guru's analysis was correct. The guru's statement helps the market reach
that conclusion faster. However, if it can be proven that the guru traded merely
to take advantage of the statement he was planning to make, and there is evi-
dence of negligent or reckless analysis (or no analysis at all) underlying his public
statements, this would be an issue of manipulation of the market. In other words,
the publication of the statement may be deemed to be a dissemination of deceptive
news intended to alter the securities market, a practice sanctioned in the anti-
manipulation provision of the Insider Trading Act. Insider Trading Act, supra note
1, art. 5; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. Moreover, the EC Direc-
tive also recognizes that in any transaction there is a decisive moment and an
operative moment-although these two moments may not, and most often do not,
coincide in time, the decisive moment cannot be said to be the inside information
on which the subsequent operative moment takes place. See Insider Trading Direc-
tive, supra note 1, pmbl., J 16. Hence, the decision of a company to take over
another company does not prevent the bidding company from purchasing shares of
the target company in the market before launching the tender offer.
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company will soon release their suggestion regarding the
company's dividend policy, without knowing whether such
suggestion will head towards greater or lesser dividend distri-
bution,' should not be considered specific because it is of no
help in estimating the price of the shares of the company,
whether it be higher or lower than the current price. Hence,
the trading taking place after the acquisition of such informa-
tion might surely bring about a profit, depending upon the
quality of the guess the insider made based on the information.
Any such profit, then, will be the result of the guess, not of any
nonpublic information.89
Second, the object of the inside information must concern
"one or more issuers of securities" or "one or more securi-
ties."90 The reference is wide enough to include both "corpo-
rate information," specifically related to the economic and
financial situation of the issuer (e.g., the finding of rich oil
wells by an oil company), and "market information," related to
facts happening "outside" the issuer of the concerned security
that may nevertheless have an effect on its price (e.g., a take-
over bid on the company). The use of the wording "concerning
one or more securities or issuers," rather than a more generic
reference such as "concerning securities and issuers of securi-
ties," seems to imply that the information should be directly
88. Under Italian corporate law, the regular meeting of shareholders makes
resolutions about the distribution of dividends. C.C. arts. 2433, 2364. The board of
directors, in this respect, only has a proposal power. Id.
89. Some commentators have argued that the strict requirement that the
information be specific and of determinate content may easily reduce any effective-
ness of the law. The concept of information is in fact typically a dynamic one, and
insiders usually trade and make profits on information which is still at its forma-
tion stage, not sufficiently specific or determined yet to fit within the definition of
article 3. See Sergio Seminara, Riflessioni in margine al disegno di legge in tema
di Insider Trading, in RWISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITrO E PROCEDURA PENALE 545, 553
(1990); Giuliano Vassalli, La Punizione deil/lnsider Trading, 35 RMSTA ITALIANA DI
DIRrITO E PROCEDURA PENALE 3, 19-20 (1992). It should be noted, however, that
any less stringent requirement in this respect might have been too vague and
thus gone against the strict application of criminal law. Luigi Foffani argues that
the rigid and narrow definition of the object of the illegal conduct (the inside
information) serves as a counterbalance to the extreme breadth of the definition of
"insider." Luigi Foffani, La Nuova Disciplina Penale dell'Jnsider Tradingo e delle
Frodi Nel Mercato Mobiliare, 4 RivisTA TRIMESTRALE DI DiRrITo PENALE
DELL'ECONOMIA 911, 918-19 (1991).
90. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 3; see also Insider Trading Direc-
tive, supra note 1, art. 1, % 1 ("[I]nformation . . . relating to one or several issu-
ers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities . . .).
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imputable to specific issuer(s) or specific security(ies). Any fact
that generally and indiscriminately pertains to a whole catego-
ry of issuers or securities (e.g., a government's decision to mod-
ify the tax status of shares or bonds), although it may have an
effect on the price of each and every one of those securities,
could not be considered to pertain to "one or more" issuers or
securities.9
Third, the information used by the insider must have not
yet been made public when the trading occurs. The defense is
to show that the public might have known about the event that
is the object of the information, not that it actually knew about
it. 2 In practice, it might be difficult to establish when and
how information should be considered public. Obviously, it will
be deemed to be public once CONSOB disclosure obligations
have been fulfilled,93 although that is not the exclusive means
91. A more specific example is the decision of the Governor of the Central
Bank to modify the official discount rate. This is surely a decision that affects the
prices of securities since it is an indication of the direction public authorities are
moving towards in administering, within their limited power, the financial market.
However, the decision to modify the official discount rate is a decision that, taken
by itself, affects the whole supply and demand of financial resources, and it cannot
be imputed to single issuers or securities, or even to Treasury bonds that are
usually the securities being affected more quickly by such decision. Of course, the
conclusion would be different if the pricing of a particular security were strictly
tied to the official discount rate, let alone its general market effect (for example,
the case of debentures issued at a variable rate to be calculated by adding a pre-
inium to the current official discount rate). The same reasoning is to be made
with respect to information regarding the issue of data concerning the inflation
rate.
92. In contrast, in commenting on the similarly worded provision of the Insid-
er Trading Directive, supra note 2, art. 1, q 1, Solimena draws attention to the
necessity that the public actually perceives the information. See Solimena, supra
note 10, at 1055. This conclusion is similar to the original version of the insider
trading bill in the Italian Parliament. In fact in that draft, reported by Seminara,
the non-publication of the information was described as "not known to the public,"
therefore implying, at least on a literal reading, that the insider would then be
able to trade only after actual public knowledge of the material information-quite
a diabolical burden of proof, indeed. See Sergio Seminara, Riflessioni in margine al
disegno di legge in tema di Insider Trading, RmSTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E
PROCEDURA PENALE 545, 554 (1990).
93. Regulations of Nov. 14, 1991, No. 5553, Gazz. Uff. (Dec. 10, 1991, No.
157), 77 Lex Part I, at 2757 [hereinafter CONSOB Regulations]. According to
these regulations, issuers of listed securities must timely disclose to the public any
material fact concerning their activity. More specifically, among the facts and
events that must always be disclosed to the public are the following: changes in
control, filing for bankruptcy, issues of new shares or debentures, mergers or divi-
sions, purchase or sale of relevant shareholdings or business branches, business
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through which the alleged insider can prove the publicity of
the information.94
In ascertaining to which persons the information should be
accessible in order to be deemed public, it should be kept in
mind that the securities market is characterized by the inter-
vention of professional intermediaries that generally assist
investors in their decisions to trade, having special fiduciary
duties towards them. 5 It follows that information should be
deemed public when it is generally accessible to such profes-
sional intermediaries, even though the general investing public
may actually not have the information yet.9" CONSOB regula-
tions seem to confirm such interpretation when stating that
the disclosure obligations are to be fulfilled by communication
to the competent exchange authorities and to two press agen-
cies.97 These information outlets are usually only immediately
available to professional intermediaries and investors, and
seldom to the general public, during the short interim in which
effective use of new information may be made in the securities
market.
Note that the duty to furnish timely disclosure through
CONSOB is only imposed on the issuers of listed securities."
reorganizations, buy-back operations, dissolution of the company, annual and con-
solidated accounts and periodical reports. Id. arts. 5-14.
94. The potential for the insider to prove that the information was completely
public despite non-compliance with CONSOB disclosure obligations is also con-
firmed by the fact that those obligations only bind issuers of listed securities,
whereas material information regarding the listed security or its issuer may well
find its source "outside" the listed issuer. Meaningful examples include: a non-
listed company's decision to launch a takeover bid on a listed company; or a deci-
sion by the Ministry of Treasury to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against a
listed banking institution.
95. Investment Business Act, supra note 17, art. 6, J 1(e). The Investment
Business Act regulates investment business transactions, requiring professional
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and managers always to keep the investor
adequately informed of the nature and risk of any transaction, and to inform the
investor of any act, fact or circumstance that may affect the investor's conscious
investment decision. Id.
96. Circolare Assonime, supra note 55, at 887.
97. CONSOB Regulations, supra note 93, art. 17.
98. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 6, 1. The timeliness of the dis-
closure should be judged from the moment the relevant information has definitely
assumed all features article 3 requires for the existence of nonpublic information.
It is no excuse for nondisclosure because of any possible prejudice that the compa-
ny may suffer as a consequence of disclosure; in that instance disclosure is to be
made to CONSOB, which may allow the issuer to keep the information secret as
long as there is no danger of inducing the market to be in error or deceit. See id.,
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The disclosure obligations may not, and usually do not, rest on
traders in possession of nonpublic information. Indeed, not
only do such insiders have a duty to abstain from trading, but
they also have a duty to keep secret the relevant information
they possess.
Finally, the nonpublic information must be material. That
is, as the statute phrases it, the information must "be able to
notably influence" the stock price. The requirement is ex-
pressed in terms of potentiality, meaning that the price effect
must be verified on an ex ante basis. It directly follows that, in
proving the materiality of the information, it is not sufficient
to show that the price of the security moved after disclosure of
the information, because there may have been other concurring
elements affecting the price of the security.
The Act gives no hint as to what sort of facts or events
make the information material.99 Only Italian case law, which
at the present is non existent, will be able to itemize material
facts and events. The most plausible general criterion seems to
be the one adopted in the United States in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson which held that information is deemed to be material
when there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would
have been considered significant by a reasonable investor.' 0
art. 6, 3(a).
99. Some legal systems have proceeded to a listing of "corporate" and "mar-
ket" events that are per se material, thus negating the prosecution's need to prove
their materiality. This approach, while ostensibly favoring greater certainty for the
application of the law, is obviously incomplete, given the infinite number of factors
that can affect the price of a security. The greater specificity in the statute, the
greater its effectiveness, but also, the easier the chance of finding loopholes. The
truth of the matter is that, consequently, those systems, along with the statutory
list of material events, have also adopted a general "any other material fact" re-
sidual clause similar to the one in the Italian statute. This is how the Swiss
Criminal Code is structured. STGB art. 161. In the United States, SEC Rule 14e-3
itemizes takeovers as material information. 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3 (1995). However,
insider trading case law under Rule 10b-5 relies upon a general notion of material
information. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1995); see generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Even CONSOB, in the disclosure regulations it issued under articles 6 and 7 of
the Insider Trading Act to prevent the creation of favorable grounds for insiders to
trade, imposed a list of specific facts that required companies and other issuers of
listed securities to timely disclose to the market, although it also included a gen-
eral "material facts disclosure" clause. CONSOB Regulations, supra note 93, tit. II
(entitled "Disclosure to the public of news, facts, statistics and studies that may
carry an interest for shareholders, investors and for the correct functioning of the
market").
100. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). It is important to
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For purposes of Italy's law, the Basic materiality test
should be read in conjunction with the provision of article 3 of
the Act which requires that the influence that the nonpublic
information be able to exert on the concerned security price
must be "notable."10 1 Thus, not just any materiality will suf-
fice, but a significant materiality. Among commentators, this
qualification has been criticized because it leaves uncertainty
in the exact definition of the illegal behavior. 2 It is perhaps
even outside the constitutional norm that criminal offenses be
precisely defined in all their elements. A possible suggestion
may be that the more significant materiality envisaged by the
law does not really imply any quantitative analysis of the
influence exertable on securities prices. Information may be
deemed to be more significantly material when a higher num-
ber of investors consider it in adjusting their investment deci-
sions. It could then be inferred that the Act's "notable" require-
ment qualifies its "reasonable investor" standard to include
information that is going to be perceived as material by a wid-
er set of investors, and not just by a few professional investors,
thus fully adopting Basic's standard.
VIII. THE COVERAGE OF THE INSIDER TRADING STATUTE: THE
NOTION OF SECURITIES
According to article 1 of the Act, the Italian insider trading
statute limits its application to securities admitted to trade on
any Italian or other EC country regulated exchange.0 3 Ital-
ian law does not encompass a precise definition of what finan-
cial instruments are to be considered securities. So far, the
term "securities" has been held to include company shares and
debentures, treasury bills and bonds, commercial papers, fu-
ture and option contracts (on currencies, indexes, interest
note that the Court in Basic further held that the materiality test must be adapt-
ed to the specific facts and events of the case. Thus, no information will be mate-
rial per se; rather, "materiality 'will depend at any given time upon a balancing of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magni-
tude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." Id. at 238
(quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
101. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 3.
102. For instance, it is difficult to imagine what criterion would be used to
determine that a 5% influence, rather than a 2% influence, meets the "notable"
standard. See Casella, supra note 80, at 866-67.
103. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 1.
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rates, or any other security), certificates of bank deposits, and
any other evidence of debt/credit or property arising from a
financial relationship, °4 documented in any standardized
form and thus marketable to, or among, the public.' The
Insider Trading Directive, on the other hand, adopted a closed
definition of securities by actually listing those financial in-
struments that should be considered securities for the purposes
of insider trading regulation. They are:
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent
to shares and debt securities;
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of
securities referred to in (a);
(c) futures contracts, options and financial futures in respect
of securities referred to in (a); and
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in
(a).10 6
The adoption of a closed definition of securities, following
the Directive's indications, would have carried the advantage
of reducing uncertainties as to borderline interpretations, al-
though, at the same time, it would have introduced an element
of rigidity that might favor loopholes. The open and flexible
nature of the notion of securities in the Italian legal system,
despite the vigorous debate it raises,' 7 allows the insider
trading prohibition to be more effective in protecting invest-
ment flows, because it is not really concerned with what kind
of existing or developing financial instrument is chosen by the
investor to invest his savings.' 8
104. A similar definition is in article 18-bis of the Law of June 7, 1974, No.
216, the statute that institutes and regulates CONSOB and the solicitation of
public savings. Law of June 7, 1974, No. 216, Gazz. Uff. (June 8, 1974, No. 149),
119 Lex Part I, at 1273, art. 18-bis. More or less the same definition is found in
article 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1994). Notice that the
notion of security presumes an underlying financial relationship, investing risk
capital, giving credit or assuming debt. Amazingly, thus far the notion of security
has not been construed as encompassing any underlying commodity transaction.
105. Antonio Serra, Valori nobilari, 46 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 200 (1993).
106. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, % 2.
107. For an overview of the debate, see Carla R. Bedogni, Valori Mobiliari, in
ENCICLOPEDIA GIUTRIDICA TRECcANI 1 (1994).
108. In the United States, however, it is difficult to discern whether an insider
would have a fiduciary relationship in transactions involving non-stock securities,
such as bonds and debentures. The difficulty may render ineffective the application
of the fiduciary duty theory in prosecutions of insider trading under SEC Rule
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The securities that may be the object of the Italian insider
trading law are more precisely defined by the requirement that
they be listed on the regulated exchanges'0 9 within the Euro-
pean Community.11 Italy's regulated exchanges are: the
Borsa Valori (the official Stock Exchange); the Mercato
Ristretto (a segment of the official Stock Exchange where secu-
rities with a lesser trading volume are usually listed, similar
to the Unlisted Securities Market in the United States or in
the United Kingdom); the MTS (the telematic exchange for
Treasury bonds), and the MIF (for futures trading). Any future
exchanges will only be considered regulated exchanges, hence
the securities traded thereon will be granted insider trading
protection, if there is some kind of state regulatory interven-
tion either in the establishment or in the function of the ex-
change."' The same criteria must also be adopted with re-
gard to EC exchanges, as also made clear by the Directive
when restricting its scope to securities traded "on a market
which is regulated and supervised by authorities recognized by
public bodies .... .1 2
10b-5. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The loophole may only be over-
come by fully accepting the "fraud-on-the-source" (misappropriation) theory as the
basis for liability. For an overview of the issue in debate, see generally Harvey L.
Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider Trading in
Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAW 187 (1993).
109. A securities exchange is any public place where vendors and buyers of
securities meet to transact their business. It does not imply a physical reunion,
but it can take place through any instrumentality that allows the prompt distribu-
tion of the information regarding the bid and ask offers (through intermediaries
and/or through telecommunications contact). The purpose of a securities exchange
is to facilitate transactions by creating an organized pattern for the conduct of
negotiations, ultimately resulting in the formation and diffusion of prices. See
generally Cinzia Motti, B/ mercato come organizzazione, in BANCA IMPRESA E
SOCIETA 455 (1991).
110. The territoriality criterion for the application of the insider trading law
provides that insiders' transactions on securities listed on an EC exchange be
subject to prosecution only if effected within the Italian territory. However,
insiders' transactions on securities listed in Italy should be prosecuted in Italy
even if effected abroad. The territoriality criterion corroborates article 9 of the
Insider Trading Act, which requires collaboration agreements among national and
international supervisory agencies. Insider Trading Act, supra note 1, art. 9.
111. Recently, CONSOB has issued regulations for establishing "local exchang-
es," to allow trading in securities which are not listed on the official Borsa Valori
or Mercato Ristretto. Regulation of Sept. 30, 1994, No. 8469, Gazz. Uff. (Oct. 12,
1994, No. 239) 80 Lex Part I, at 3386. The trading structures that will be created
following these regulations will be regulated exchanges as well.
112. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, % 2. As far as Italy is
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The reason for limiting the application of the law to securi-
ties traded on public exchanges is evident in the objectives that
the legislature pursued in prohibiting insider trading, i.e., the
protection of the credibility of the capital market through the
enhancement of investors' confidence." 3 Securities exchanges
are facilities to dispose of one's assets and, at the same time,
by being publicly accessible, represent the meeting point of the
supply and demand of public savings. The immediacy, anonym-
ity, and impersonality characterizing trading on exchanges
make it very difficult for any private law remedy, based upon
contract or tort, to be enforced against the insider as a defense
for the weaker party to the transaction (i.e., the least in-
formed). However, transactions on listed securities are worthy
of protection as an expression of the interaction between the
general supply and demand of public savings, whose correct
functioning is deemed essential to encourage overall economic
growth and welfare."' This justifies the stronger criminal
concerned, the requirement that exchanges be under some kind of government
supervision is not novel. Traditionally, the creation of a securities exchange has
been held to be within state prerogatives and not completely available to private
initiative. See generally Valentino Vulpetti, Profili Istituzionali Del C.D. "Mercato
Secondario Dei Titoli Di Stato", 27 QUADERNI CERADI SERIE - RICERCHE - 1
(1991); Cinzia Motti, 11 Mercato Come Organizzazione, in BANCA IMPRESA E
SOCIETk 455 (1991). The Investment Business Act authorized CONSOB to institute
new public exchanges for securities and to regulate any trading taking place there-
on. Investment Business Act, supra note 17, arts. 20-23. Hence, any Italian ex-
change can be individuated as regulated through its formal act of public recog-
nition. The situation is different with respect to other EC countries, such as Eng-
land, where the creation and supervision of securities exchanges is not an exclu-
sive prerogative of the state or of some delegated government agency. Quite often,
in fact, securities exchanges in England are the result of private initiative, and
are self-regulated by intermediaries and investors. However, the wording of the
Insider Trading Directive seems to imply that mere self-regulation, unsupported by
at least some sort of quality recognition by the state, will not be sufficient to turn
an organized exchange into a "regulated exchange" for the purposes of insider
trading enforcement. England meets this criterion through the rules promulgated
under the Financial Services Act of 1986. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §37.
113. See Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. 9.
114. There is a constitutional background for such protection in the Italian
Constitution: "The Republic encourages and safeguards savings in all its as-
pects .... It [also] encourages . . . direct or indirect investment in large produc-
tive enterprise." Costituzione art. 47. In private transactions, this "public interest"
in preserving the confidence in the system appears weaker, because such confi-
dence can well be attained through the self-protection mechanisms that general
contract law assures to private individuals, as, for instance, the possibility of void-
ing the contract should elements of deceit recur. For example, Messineo argues
that the nondisclosure of facts relevant to the substance of a contract is bad faith
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protection granted by insider trading laws to persons engaging
in transactions in listed securities, as compared to the mere
civil remedies available with regard to transactions in non-
listed securities.
In apparent contradiction with these conclusions is the
fact that the insider trading prohibitions apply to any trading
of listed securities, whether on or off the exchange. A violation
of the law, and the criminal enforcement thereof, is then possi-
ble also in a private purchase or a private sale of listed securi-
ties. The parties to these private transactions, should they hold
inside information, do preserve the same duties and are sub-
ject to the same criminal penalties as if they were operating on
anonymous and impersonal exchanges, although the situation
does not seem to be any different from any private transaction
in unlisted securities. The extension to instances where caveat
emptor mechanisms easily may be enforced as a measure of
self-protection by the individual parties seems to contrast with
the public savings protection rationale previously suggested.
This extension goes beyond the EC Directive, whose concern
was mainly to protect transactions characterized by the impos-
sibility or difficulty in evaluating the other party's good faith,
either because of the impersonality of exchange transactions,
or because of the anonymity assured by the intervention of
professional intermediaries in private transactions.
Article 2 of the Directive, while stating that the insider
trading prohibition should apply to any purchase or sale of
listed securities effected by the means of the intervention of a
professional intermediary, also allows member states not to
enforce the prohibition with regard to off-exchange transac-
tions without professional intermediation."5 Italy's failure to
behavior and is therefore a justified basis for avoidance. FRANCESCO MESSINEO, IL
CONTRATrO IN GENERE 300 (1973). In supporting this argument, the author cites
article 1892 of the Civil Code. Id. Article 1892 governs insurance contracts and
states that a contract can be voided if the contractor, acting with intent or in a
grossly negligent manner, fails to disclose any circumstances the knowledge of
which would have caused the insurer not to agree to the contract or to close it on
different terms. C.C. art. 1892. The same result is reached by Visintini, although
she argues for a private remedy, concluding that the duty to disclose any special
facts regarding a contract being closed is part of the general duty of good faith in
contract negotiations, as prescribed in article 1337 of the Civil Code. GIOVANNA
VISINTINI, LA RETICENZA NELLA FORMAZIONE DEI CONTRATIM (1972); see C.C. art.
1337.
115. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, 3.
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implement this restriction seems excessive and shows an in-
tent of the legislature to moralize the market for securities,
without however correspondingly enhancing any general eco-
nomic interest. The only rational justification for extending lia-
bility to face-to-face transactions of listed securities without
intermediaries may be the absence of effective concentration of
securities bargains on the exchanges." 6 This, while being
likely grounds for going around the insider trading prohibi-
tions, causes fragmentation of the supply and demand of in-
vestment resources and hence requires that the allocation of
those resources, wherever it takes place, not be further affect-
ed by the distorting factors added by possible insider trading
practices.
IX. CONCLUSION
Ironically, the Italian law concerning insider trading, de-
spite the attempt at codification, by no means reaches the
same degree of certainty as U.S. law. In its strictly literal
interpretation, the Italian statute seems to concentrate on
possession of material nonpublic information, with no direct
reference to abuses of position or breaches of duties. The mere
fact of entrusting a person with confidential information seems
sufficient to turn this person into an "insider" and impose on
him a duty to abstain from trading. Moreover, the tipping and
recommending prohibitions not requiring any actual trading,
the possible requirement of "general intent" in the trading
prohibition, and the regulatory powers given to CONSOB
aimed at ensuring timely disclosure of material facts to the
market, seem to confirm that the protection envisaged by the
law is addressed at removing the danger that any unequal
access to information may occur. Interpretative efforts are
being made in order to restrain the scope of the letter of the
law and, as shown, there is room for such efforts to be at least
partially successful. However, if these efforts are unsuccessful,
then the purpose of the statute will remain the right of all
116. The Investment Business Act, supra note 17, art. 11, requires that all
transactions on listed securities take place on regulated exchanges, although such
requirement is only applicable to authorized broker-dealers. Moreover, the concen-
tration requirement is waivable in bloc transactions, even when broker-dealers are
involved. Investment Business Act, supra note 17, art. 11.
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investors to equal access to material information rather than
the regulation of fraudulent behavior that upsets financial
markets and investor expectations.
From a comparative perspective, it is important to point
out that viewing insider trading legislation as regulation of the
fraudulent gain and misuse of material nonpublic information,
as it is in the United States, is quite different from viewing it
as regulation of investors' equal access to information. They
are qualitatively different approaches. They may both be valid
options for the legislature as long as it is understood that each
one of them is aimed at the protection of a different set of
values. The U.S. approach is concerned with dishonesty in the
conduct of the market. In general terms, it seems to assert the
principle that anybody may enter the market, but must do so
"with clean hands." Therefore, its anti-fraud nature probably
justifies the harshness of the criminal punishment. The equal
access approach of Italy, instead, is concerned with the alleged
inherent unfairness of unequal market positions. In the first
case, the anti-fraud approach, the emphasis is on the behavior
leading to the unequal market position. Instead, in the second
case, the equal access approach, the main emphasis is on the
inequality situation per se.
However, in adopting either approach, any legal system
should be wary of the existing tension in the securities market
between different policies: the necessity to foster the free flow
of information, on one side, and the need to strengthen the
confidence of investors by setting rules for fair conduct of the
market, on the other side."' The compromise between these
equally important features for the correct functioning of the
financial market is not always easy and requires continuous
contingent adjustments. Therefore, any rigid normative defini-
tion may end up favoring too much one policy or the other,
thus hampering the correct allocation of financial resources
through the market mechanisms.
117. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54, 658-59 (1983) (demonstrating
the awareness of such tension).
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Law of May 17, 1991, No. 157. Rules Concerning the Use
of Nonpublic Information in Securities Transactions, and
the National Commission for Companies and the Securi-
ties Exchange (CONSOB).'
Article 1. 1) For the purposes of this Act, securities are all
those traded on Italian and other EC regulat-
ed exchanges.
Article 2. 1) It is prohibited to purchase or to sell or to
effect any other transaction, even through the
interposition of another person, in securities,
including the relative rights of option pertain-
ing thereto, when one is in possession of
nonpublic information obtained by virtue of
being a shareholder of a company, or by rea-
son of the exercise of a function, even public,
a profession or an office.
2) It is also prohibited to communicate to third
parties, without any justifying motive, the
information under paragraph 1 of this article,
or to recommend third parties, on the basis of
said information, to effect the transactions
under paragraph 1 of this article.
3) The shareholders asserting even de facto
control over the company pursuant to article
2359 of the Civil Code,2 the directors, the
liquidators, the officers, the members of the
internal supervisory board, and the auditors
of accounts are prohibited from purchasing or
selling or effecting any other transaction,
even through the interposition of another
1. Law of May 17, 1991, No. 157, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana
[Gazz. Uff.] (May 20, 1991, No. 116), 77 Lex Part I, at 1241.
2. Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code states, in pertinent part, that a
controlling relationship exists when: a) a company has the majority of the votes
that can be exercised in the ordinary shareholders' meeting of another company; b)
a company has enough votes in the ordinary shareholders' meeting of another
company so as to exercise a dominant influence; and c) a company can exercise a
dominant influence over another company by virtue of a contractual relationship
with it. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 2359.
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person, in securities, after a meeting of the
board of directors, or equivalent body, has
been called to resolve upon operations which
are able to notably influence the price of the
security itself, and before the resolution has
been made public. When the provisions under
this paragraph are violated, the penalties
under paragraph 5 of this article are doubled.
4) The prohibitions of the preceding paragraphs
are extended to all those who, directly or
indirectly, have obtained information, know-
ing of its nonpublic character, from persons
that possess such information by reason of
the exercise of their function, profession or
office.
5) In the course of the criminal proceeding, the
provisions under article 290 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure apply.3 The violation of
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs is
punished with imprisonment up to 1 year and
with a fine of between 10 million and 300
million lire, except that the judge may in-
crease the fine up to three times as much
when, due to the gravity of the violation, the
fine may be deemed inadequate even if im-
posed to its maximum. The accessory penal-
ties under articles 28,' 30,' 32-bis (para. 1),6
and 32-ter' of the Criminal Code are to be
imposed for a period not less than 6 months
and not exceeding 2 years. The sentence in-
volves the publication of the sentence in at
3. Article 290 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure allows judges tempo-
rarily to enjoin the defendant from exercising specific professions or entrepreneur-
ial activities, or from holding corporate offices. Codice di procedura penale [C.P.P.]
art. 290.
4. Article 28 of the Criminal Code disqualifies violators from holding public
office. Codice penale [C.P.] art. 28.
5. Article 30 of the Criminal Code disqualifies violators from conducting a
profession or trade which requires a special authorization or license. C.P. art. 30.
6. Article 32obis disqualifies violators from holding corporate or management
office. C.P. art. 32-bis, % 1.
7. Article 32-ter disqualifies violators from contracting with the Public Ad-
ministration. C.P. art. 32-ter.
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least two national daily newspapers, of which
one must be an economic newspaper.
6) The penalties under paragraph 5 will also be
applied to acts committed abroad, provided
that the acts committed abroad deal with
securities traded on Italian regulated ex-
changes. In all other cases, the provisions of
articles 7, 8, 9, and 108 of the Criminal Code
apply.
7) The Ministers and Undersecretaries of State
are prohibited from purchasing or selling or
effecting any other transaction, even through
the interposition of another person, in securi-
ties, after a meeting of the Council of Minis-
ters or of an Interministerial Committee has
been called in order to adopt resolutions
which could notably influence prices, and
before said resolutions have been made pub-
lic. When the provisions of this paragraph are
violated, the penalties under paragraph 5 are
doubled.
Article 3. 1) Nonpublic information under article 2 means
information which is specific of determinate
content, that has not been made public, con-
cerning one or more issuers of securities or
one or more securities, and which, if made
public, would be able to notably influence the
price of the security.
Article 4. 1) The provisions of articles 2 and 3 do not ap-
ply to transactions effected by the Italian
State, by the Banca d'Italia (the Central
Bank), by the Ufficio Italiano Cambi (the
Foreign Exchange Office), and by any other
person acting on their behalf for reasons
connected with monetary policy, foreign ex-
change policy and the management of public
8. Articles 7-10 of the Criminal Code regulate situations in which Italian
criminal law applies to offenses committed outside Italian territory. C.P. arts. 7-10.
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debt or of official reserves.
Article 5. 1) Whoever divulges false, exaggerated or decep-
tive news, or effects simulated transactions or
any other artifice, which are able to notably
influence the price of securities, will be pun-
ished by a term of imprisonment not exceed-
ing 6 months and a fine of between 1 million
and 30 million lire.
2) If the violation under paragraph 1 of this
article is committed with the purpose of caus-
ing a notable alteration of the price of securi-
ties, or the appearance of an active market on
such securities, the penalties under article
501 of the Criminal Code9 are to be imposed.
3) In any violations under paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this article, if the notable alteration of the
price of securities or the appearance of an
active market on such securities takes place,
the penalties thereof are increased. The ac-
cessory penalties under articles 28, 30, 32-bis
(para. 1), and 32-ter of the Criminal Code are
to be imposed for a period not less than 6
months and not exceeding 2 years.
4) Article 501, paragraph 3, of the Criminal
Code applies.
5) The penalty is doubled if the crimes under
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article are commit-
ted by the shareholders exercising even de
facto control over the company pursuant to
article 2359 of the Civil Code, the directors,
the liquidators, the officers, the members of
the internal supervisory board, the auditors
of accounts, the officers of companies or enti-
9. Article 501 of the Criminal Code, subtitled "Fraudulent Manipulation of
Prices in the Public Markets or on Commercial Exchanges," prescribes, in perti-
nent part, penalties of up to 3 years imprisonment and a fine of between 1 mil-
lion and 50 million lire. C.P. art. 501.
10. Article 501, % 3 states that penalties are doubled if the offense is commit-
ted by a citizen in order to favor foreign interests, or if the offense causes a de-
preciation of the value of the national currency or of government bonds, or if it
causes a price increase in goods commonly or widely consumed. C.P. art. 501, 3.
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ties issuing securities, or of broker-dealer
companies, or by agenti di cambio (certified
securities brokers), or by members or employ-
ees of CONSOB, or by the local market au-
thorities, or if the crime is committed by
means of the press or other mass media.
Article 6. 1) CONSOB shall prescribe, with regulations to
be issued within 180 days from the date this
Act becomes effective, the methods of regis-
tration, through electronic procedures in each
regulated exchange by security and by inter-
mediary, of all transactions effected in securi-
ties, and it shall also prescribe the methods of
registration, through electronic procedures, to
be adopted by each person acting as an
intermediary for the transactions effected on
securities, classified by security and by client.
With the same regulations, CONSOB shall
prescribe the methods, the terms and the
conditions for the disclosure to the public of
all news, facts, statistics and studies, concern-
ing the listed companies and their controlled
companies, whether subsidiaries or companies
in any way connected, pursuant to articles 1
through 9 of the Law of October 10, 1990, No.
287," though not quoted, being of interest to
the shareholders, the investors, and to the
correct functioning of the market.
2) With the same regulations, CONSOB shall
prescribe the methods and terms by which
brokers or intermediaries must report the off-
exchange transactions on securities listed in
the Borsa Valori or on those admitted to the
Mercato ristretto.
3) The regulations shall also prescribe:
a) if the directors object, by filing a motivat-
11. This law embodies the Italian antitrust law. Articles 1-9 of the law regu-
late agreements, abuses of dominant position, and concentrations of firms. Law of
Oct. 10, 1990, No. 287, Gazz. Uff. (Oct. 13, 1990, No. 240), arts. 1-9, 76 Lex Part
I, at 1839.
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ed complaint, claiming that the spread of
the news under paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this article may cause serious harm to
the company, they must give immediate
communication to CONSOB which, with-
in 48 hours, having examined the argu-
ments brought forward, may exclude,
even partially or temporarily, the spread
of the information itself, provided this
shall not induce error in the public with
regard to essential facts and circumstanc-
es;
b) the company or the entity may not, in the
meantime, proceed to disclose to the
public any subsequent news under para-
graphs 1 and 2 of this article, which in
all cases must immediately be communi-
cated to CONSOB.
Article 7. 1) Persons that violate the provisions of the
regulations under article 6 are subject to the
following sanctions, considering the gravity
and the possible recidivism of the violation:
a) reprimand by CONSOB;
b) pecuniary sanctions between 10 million
and 250 million lire imposed by decree of
the Minister of Treasury, on the advice of
CONSOB.
2) The sanctions shall be given publicity, at the
expense of persons against whom they are im-
posed, pursuant to the methods prescribed by
CONSOB.
Article 8. 1) CONSOB shall effect the acts necessary to
verify any violation of the provisions under
articles 2 and 5 using, against all persons
mentioned in the articles 2 and 5, the powers
provided by article 3 of the Decree-Law of
April 8, 1974, No. 95.12 For this purpose
12. Decree-Law of Apr. 8, 1974, No. 95, Gazz. Uff. (Apr. 9, 1974, No. 94), art.
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CONSOB may collaborate with any public
administration and may request all necessary
information from persons mentioned in arti-
cles 2 and 5, and from the financial interme-
diaries involved in the transactions. The
denunciation under articles 361 and 362 of
the Criminal Code13 must be proposed exclu-
sively to the President of CONSOB.
2) The directors and liquidators, the members of
the internal supervisory board, the auditors
of accounts, the officers of companies or enti-
ties, and all other persons under obligation
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, who
do not comply with the terms of CONSOB's
requests, or who obstruct or delay the exer-
cise of CONSOB's functions, shall be subject,
unless the act constitutes a more serious
crime, to the penalty of arrest not exceeding 3
months or of a levy between 2 million and 40
million lire.
3) The President of CONSOB shall transmit to
the Pubblico Ministero (District Attorney)
competent under paragraph 4 of this article,
through a motivated report, the documenta-
tion collected during the verifying activities
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, when-
ever it is believed that there has been a viola-
tion of the provisions under articles 2 and 5.
4) For criminal violations of the provisions un-
der articles 2 and 5, the competent court is
the one sitting in the capital city of the court
3, 119 Lex Part I, at 979, modified by Law of June 7, 1974, No. 216, Gazz. Uff.
(June 8, 1974, No. 149), art.3, 119 Lex Part I, at 1481, amended by Law of June
4, 1985, No. 281, Gazz. Uff. Supp. (June 18, 1985, No. 142), art. 5, 141 Lex Part
I, at 1273. Article 3 of the Law of June 7, 1974, No. 216, grants CONSOB broad
powers to require full disclosure from listed companies, to impose penalties on
directors, members of the supervisory board, officers, and auditors of accounts of
listed companies who do not cooperate. Law of June 7, 1974, No. 216, Gazz. Uff.
(June 8, 1974, No. 149), art. 3, 119 Lex Part I, at 1481.
13. Articles 361 and 362 of the Criminal Code state that public officials must
report to the judicial authorities, in a timely manner, any offense of which they
have notice in the performance of their duties. C.P. 361-362.
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of appeals district in the territory in which
the crime has been committed.
5) If notice of the crimes under articles 2 and 5
is acquired differently, the proceeding judicial
authority shall inform the President of
CONSOB in a timely fashion.
6) In proceedings for crimes under articles 2 and
5, CONSOB exercises the same rights and
powers that the Code of Criminal Procedure
assigns to persons offended by the crime, and
CONSOB also exercises the powers recog-
nized under articles 505 and 511 of the same
Code of Criminal Procedure 4 to the entities
and associations representing the interests
harmed by the crime.
Article 9. 1) Contrary to the provisions under paragraph
11 of article 1 of the Law of June 7, 1974, No.
216,15 CONSOB shall collaborate and ex-
change information, within its competencies,
with the competent authorities of the other
EC Member States. Moreover, if based on
reciprocity agreements, CONSOB may collab-
orate and exchange information with the
competent authorities of non-EC Member
States.
2) The data and news obtained pursuant to
paragraph 1 are protected official secrets,
within the limits of article 1, paragraph 11 of
the Law of June 7, 1974, No. 216.
Article 10. 1) In the first paragraph of article 2631 of the
14. Under articles 505 and 511 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, CONSOB
will be able to intervene at the trial and question witnesses, experts and other
intervening parties; it may ask the judge to admit new evidence; and it may ask
that a full reading of the acts and reports acquired during the investigation be
given during the course of the trial. C.P.P. arts. 505, 511.
15. Article 1, 11 prescribes that all data, news, and information acquired by
CONSOB in the course of its activities are protected by secrecy even against all
public administrative bodies, except for the Minister of Treasury. Law of June 7,
1974, No. 216, Gazz. Uff. (June 8, 1974, No. 149), art. 1, 119 Lex Part I, at 1481,
q 11, amended by Law of June 4, 1985, No. 281, Gazz. Uff. Supp. (June 18, 1985,
No. 142), art. 5, 141 Lex Part I, at 1273.
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Civil Code," after the words: "resolutions of
the board," add the following: "or of the execu-
tive committee."
2) In the second paragraph of the same article
2631, after the words: "from the resolution,"
add the following: "or from the operation."
Article 11. 1) This Act shall become effective the day after
its publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale (Offi-
cial Gazzette).
16. Article 2631 prescribes criminal penalties for corporate directors who do
not forebear action when a conflict of interest arises. C.C. 2631.
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